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63 
Central Bank Autonomy in Latin America:   
A Survey and Case Studies 
Harout Jack Samra* 
There is no subtler, no surer means of overturning the existing basis 
of society than to debauch the currency.  The process engages all the 
hidden forces of economic law on the side of destruction, and does it in 
a manner which not one man in a million is able to diagnose. 
– John Maynard Keynes1 
INTRODUCTION 
Beads of sweat forming on his furrowed brow, an 
uncharacteristically anxious Hugo Chavez appeared on television 
from the Miraflores Palace early in the morning of December 3, 
2007.2  For a nation accustomed to seeing its bombastic president 
sing the praises of his “Bolivarian” Revolution, Chavez struck the 
pose of a leader under siege.  Though many experts had 
speculated that the sweeping constitutional amendments he had 
proposed a mere two months earlier might fail, amendments 
which would have wrought far-reaching changes on Venezuela, 
few were prepared for the political theatre which ensued when 
they actually did.3  Given Chavez’s seeming grasp on all the 
levers of Venezuelan power, many observers noted that the 
proposed amendments, collectively referred to as the Reforma de 
la Constitución de la República Bolivariana de Venezuela (the 
Reforma), would all but make him the latest in a long line of 
Latin American caudillos that litter the region’s history.4 
 
* International litigation and arbitration associate at Squire, Sanders & Dempsey 
L.L.P.  J.D., magna cum laude, May 2009, University of Miami School of Law; M.B.A., 
May 2008, University of Miami School of Business Administration; B.A., cum laude, 
University of Miami, December 2004.  I want to thank Professor Stanley Langbein for his 
patience and dedication and R. Scott Nuzum, Jordan Dresnick, and Natalie Rico for their 
valuable advice. 
 1 JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF PEACE 236 (1920). 
 2 See Simon Romero, Venezuela Vote Sets Roadblocks on Chávez Path, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 4, 2007, at A1. 
 3 Editorial, Not so Fast, Venezuelans Warn Chavez, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Dec. 8, 
2007, at 16A. 
 4 See Roger Cohen, Op-Ed, Democracy In the Americas, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, 2007, at 
A41.  See also ANDRÉS OPPENHEIMER, CUENTOS CHINOS 223–63 (2005); Mario Garcia-
Serra, The “Enabling Law”: The Demise of the Separation of Powers in Hugo Chavez’s 
Venezuela, 32 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 265, 266 (2001).  A caudillo is defined as: 
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In its coverage of the referendum, the media largely focused 
on the abandonment of term limits for the president, which many 
suggested would result in Chavez becoming a president for life.5  
In addition to term limits, the Reforma also included sweeping 
changes to several important governmental institutions, such as 
the military and the central bank, the Banco Central de 
Venezuela.6  Indeed, the Reforma explicitly provided for the 
abolition of central bank independence.7  Had the Reforma 
passed, proposed Article 318 would have provided the following, 
in part: The National Executive authority, through the Banco 
Central de Venezuela, acting in strict and obligatory coordination, 
will determine the monetary policies and will exert the monetary 
authority of the National Power.8 
While the scope of this effort is not limited to the 
“Bolivarian” travails of Mr. Chavez, this episode makes one fact 
plain: the independence of central banking authorities in the 
various Latin American states is frequently the subject of great 
political upheaval.  Indeed, the drastic political turmoil that has 
long been endemic to the region has also led to frequent and 
radical policy changes in this central state function.9  Whether 
labeled “neoliberal” or “Washington Consensus,” many of the 
policies advocated for in this paper are not without precedent in 
the region—and they certainly are capable of arousing significant 
passion and controversy at the hands of populist leaders.  Indeed, 
Professor Felipe Larrain of the Pontificia Universidad Catolica 
 
A Latin American military dictator.  In the wake of the Latin American 
independence movement in the early 19th century, politically unstable 
conditions and the long experience of armed conflict led to the emergence in 
many of the new countries of strongmen who were often charismatic and whose 
hold on power depended on control over armed followers, patronage, and 
vigilance.  Because their power was based on violence and personal relations, 
the legitimacy of the caudillos’ rule was always in doubt, and few could 
withstand the challenges of new leaders who emerged among their own 
followers and wealthy patrons. 
ENCYCLOPÆDIA BRITANNICA ONLINE (2009), available at http://www.britannica.com/ 
EBchecked/topic/100372/caudillo. 
 5 Chris Kraul, Venezuelan Voters Reject Bid by Chavez to Extend Powers, L.A. 
TIMES, Dec. 3, 2007, at A1. 
 6 Id. 
 7 It must be noted that the terms central bank “autonomy” and “independence” are 
used interchangeably throughout this paper. 
 8 La Reforma de la Constitución de la Républica Bolivariana de Venezuela (2007) 
[hereinafter “La Reforma”].  Article 318 of La Reforma reads as follows: “El Poder 
Ejecutivo Nacional, a través del Banco Central de Venezuela, en estricta y obligatoria 
coordinación, fijará las políticas monetarias y ejercerá las competencias monetarias del 
Poder Nacional.”  All translations of Article 318 are by the author. 
 9 See, e.g., Luis Jácome H., Legal Central Bank Independence and Inflation in Latin 
America During the 1990s, 4 (IMF, Working Paper No. 01/212 2001), available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2001/wp01212.pdf. 
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de Chile pointedly noted that while Latin America has made 
great strides in controlling inflation, the fact that two of the 
region’s largest economies, Venezuela and Argentina, have 
returned to double-digit inflation rates of around 20% and 10%, 
respectively, is deeply troubling and has “led some pundits to 
wonder whether high inflation—and even hyperinflation—may 
be on its way back to Latin America.”10  Further, even though the 
renowned Larrain noted the present absence of many of the 
historical causes of hyperinflation, he nevertheless seemed to 
strike a dark note, referring particularly to the case of Chavez’s 
Venezuela:  
The true risk of high inflation in Latin America lies in populism.  It is 
no coincidence that Venezuela is the country with the highest rate of 
inflation in the region—though low by historical standards.  Hugo 
Chavez, Venezuela’s president, is the face of Latin American 
populism, though of a different brand; a rare mix of socialism and 
populism for export which can be sustained without an explosion of 
inflation as long as oil-related fiscal revenues remain generous.  If 
that situation changes—and it will when the international cycle 
turns—the risk of high inflation is at the door.  Hyperinflation is not 
dead, it is merely sleeping.  Leaders such as Zimbabwe’s Robert 
Mugabe are capable of awakening the monster.11 
This ominous warning is perhaps all the more terrifying given 
the knowledge that Larrain’s expectation that energy prices 
would fall in the short term has indeed come to pass.  Are we 
merely waiting at this stage for the other shoe to drop? 
Central bank autonomy, most scholars agree, is a sine qua 
non of monetary or price stability.12  Recent scholarship has 
divided this pillar of economic stability into two categories: de 
jure and de facto sovereignty.13  Clearly, while this study will 
disproportionately focus on formal legal structures that have 
been or may be put into place in order to provide for independent 
monetary judgment, such formalism often fails to truly explain 
the full extent of political interference in the central bank 
decision-making processes.  A state may have a finely crafted 
legal structure in place that, while perfect in form, fails utterly in 
function.  It is with this understanding that I shall consider 
several important case studies focusing on Latin America.  Over 
the last two decades, reforms strengthening central bank 
 
 10 Felipe Larrain, The Spectre of Latin American Inflation, THE BANKER, Sept., 2007 
at 176. 
 11 Id. 
 12 Agustín Carstens & Luis Jácome H., Latin American Central Bank Reform: 
Progress and Challenges, 6 (IMF, Working Paper No. 05/114 2005), available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2005/wp05114.pdf. 
 13 See, e.g., id. 
Do Not Delete 2/6/2010 1:03 PM 
66 Chapman Law Review [Vol. 13:63 
autonomy have been implemented throughout the region.  
Between the late 1980s and 1990s, for example, numerous 
countries in the region made such reforms, including Chile 
(1989), El Salvador (1991), Argentina (1992), Colombia (1992), 
Venezuela (1992), Ecuador (1992 and 1998), Peru (1993), Mexico 
(1993), Bolivia (1995), Costa Rica (1995), Uruguay (1995), 
Paraguay (1995), Honduras (1996) and Nicaragua (1999).14  By 
highlighting several of these reforms, I hope to outline the 
existing trends in the region. 
Following this brief introduction, Section I of this study will 
provide a comprehensive review of the economic literature 
relating to the economic benefits of central bank independence, 
including a description of the various models and methods 
economists have used to analyze the issue.  Section II will consist 
of three shorter case studies from the region, specifically 
addressing the central bank structures that have been adopted in 
Argentina, Chile, and Mexico.  In each case, recent central bank 
policy shifts will be addressed and placed in historical context.  
Section III will return to the issue of the Venezuelan 
amendments proposed by Mr. Chavez.  In addition to presenting 
a detailed analysis of the banking amendments that were offered 
and rejected by the public, this section will also discuss the 
aftermath of that stunning electoral rejection and the current 
state of affairs in Venezuela.  Finally, the conclusion will place 
Venezuela in the broader context of the region and discuss the 
general trends that seem to be forming throughout Latin 
America. 
I.  CENTRAL BANK INDEPENDENCE AND PRICE STABILITY 
A. The Scourge of Inflation 
Prior to discussing the economic literature on the correlation 
between central bank autonomy and price stability, it is worth 
stepping back for a moment and discussing inflation as a 
phenomenon in itself.  I will soon discuss the trade-off faced by 
monetary decision makers between short-term growth and 
longer-term inflation, and the balance that central bankers or 
monetary authorities must seek to achieve between these two.  
However, pointing to the destructive capacity of this economic 
phenomenon, the eminent economist Milton Friedman noted, 
“inflation is a disease, a dangerous and sometimes fatal disease, 
a disease that, if not checked in time, can destroy a society.”15  
 
 14 Jácome, supra note 9, at 6. 
 15 MILTON FRIEDMAN, MONEY MISCHIEF: EPISODES IN MONETARY HISTORY 191 
(1994). 
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Indeed, referring to Bolivia, Brazil, and Argentina, Friedman 
noted that Latin America is hardly a stranger to catastrophic 
hyperinflation in the modern era.16  Looking over the history of 
the region, he noted that hyperinflations in Chile, Brazil, and 
Argentina imposed broad political and social costs, including the 
establishment of military governments in the mid-twentieth 
century.17  More recently, Friedman asserted, “repeated 
inflations in Brazil . . . in the 1980s have led to the repeated 
unsuccessful ‘reforms,’ the replacement of governments, flights of 
capital, and heightened economic instability.”18 
As to the proximate cause of inflation, Friedman noted that 
“[t]here is probably no other proposition in economics that is as 
well established as” the principle that “[i]nflation occurs when 
the quantity of money rises appreciably more rapidly than 
output, and the more rapid the rise in quantity of money per unit 
of output, the greater the rate of inflation.”19  The fundamental 
challenge embedded in this dilemma, however, is the fact that 
“[o]utput is limited by the physical and human resources 
available and by the degree of knowledge and capacity for using 
those resources,” whereas “modern forms of money—paper and 
bookkeeping entries—are subject to no such physical limits.”20 
Pointing to the Brazilian experience between 1965 and 1989 
during which the quantity of money per unit of output correlated 
quite closely with the high rate of inflation, Friedman noted that 
“the price level at the end [was] nearly 6 million times the level 
at the beginning—an average of 86.5 percent a year.”21  
Considering the Brazilian dilemma, Friedman predicted that the 
country would not be able to operate at such “hyperinflationary 
rates without abandoning its national currency and adopting a 
substitute.”22  Indeed, in the subsequent years, the government 
would adopt several substitutes in its long and painful journey 
back to price stability.23 
B. The Centrality of Central Bank Independence 
B.W. Fraser, the former Governor of the Reserve Bank of 
Australia, perhaps summed up the importance of central bank 
independence most effectively when he noted, “price stability is 
 
 16 Id. 
 17 Id. at 192. 
 18 Id. 
 19 Id. at 193. 
 20 Id. at 193–94. 
 21 Id. at 199. 
 22 Id. at 200. 
 23 Id. 
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generally considered a good thing, and . . . an independent 
central bank can help to achieve it.  I do not need to dwell on the 
desirability of price stability.  Economies work better if 
investment and wage decisions are not confused and thwarted by 
high inflation.”24  Further emphasizing the importance of 
mitigating inflation, Fraser added, “some people see price 
stability as an anchor not only for the economy, but also for 
society at large.”25  He emphasized, however, that keeping prices 
stable is “not the natural order of things in a modern economy.”26 
Several centuries earlier, the eminent British economist 
David Ricardo advocated for greater independence for monetary 
authorities.27  In his Plan for the Establishment of a National 
Bank, Ricardo made plain his lack of confidence in political 
decision-making in the arena of monetary policy: 
It is said that Government could not be safely entrusted with the 
power of issuing paper money; that it would most certainly abuse it; 
and that, on any occasion when it was pressed for money to carry on a 
war, it would cease to pay coin, on demand, for its notes; and from 
that moment the currency would become a forced Government paper.  
There would, I confess, be great danger of this, if Government—as 
that is to say, the Ministers—were themselves to be entrusted with 
the power of issuing paper money.  But I propose to place this trust in 
the hands of Commissioners, not removable from their official 
situation but by a vote of one or both Houses of Parliament.  I propose 
also to prevent all intercourse between these Commissioners and 
Ministers, by forbidding every species of money transaction between 
them.  The Commissioners should never, on any pretence, lend money 
to Government, nor be in the slightest degree under its control or 
influence.  Over Commissioners so entirely independent of them, the 
Ministers would have much less power than they now possess over the 
Bank Directors.  Experience shows how little this latter body have 
been able to withstand the cajolings of Ministers; and how frequently 
they have been induced to increase their advances on exchequer bills 
and treasury bills, at the very moment they were themselves 
declaring that it would be attended with the greatest risk to the 
stability of their establishment, and to the public interest. . . . I ask, 
then, whether the country would not possess a greater security 
against all such influence, over the minds of the issuers of paper, as 
would induce them to swerve from the strict line of their duty, if the 
paper money of the country were issued by Commissioners, on the 
plan I have proposed, rather than by the Bank of England, as at 
 
 24 B.W. Fraser, Central Bank Independence: What Does It Mean?, RES. BANK OF 
AUSTL. BULL. 1, 2 (1994), available at http://www.rba.gov.au/PublicationsAndResearch/ 
Bulletin/bu_dec94/bu_1294_1.pdf. 
 25 Id. 
 26 Id. (emphasis in original). 
 27 Id. at 1. 
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present constituted?  If Government wanted money, it should be 
obliged to raise it in the legitimate way; by taxing the people; by the 
issue and sale of exchequer bills, by funded loans, or by borrowing 
from any of the numerous banks which might exist in the country; but 
in no case should it be allowed to borrow from those who have the 
power of creating money.28 
Other economists, including John Maynard Keynes, later 
adopted similar views to Ricardo’s as to the benefits of central 
bank independence.29  Further, modern empirical analysis has 
largely affirmed Ricardo’s prescience.  Such analysis has shed 
much light on the real, measurable impact of a central bank 
beholden to politically motivated actors. 
Echoing Ricardo, Federal Reserve Board Chairman Ben 
Bernanke explained “[t]hat central bank independence promotes 
lower inflation in developed countries is well-established by the 
economic literature.”30  An insufficiently independent central 
bank, he added, “may be forced to ease policy inappropriately to 
reduce the financing costs of government debt or to help re-elect 
incumbents.”31  Pointing to Latin America in particular, 
Bernanke noted that “[i]n the late 1980s and early 1990s, several 
countries took steps to enhance central bank independence, both 
through constitutional provisions, and through changes in the 
central bank law.”32  It must be noted, however, that he added 
the following caveat: “Although the evidence for developing 
countries is more mixed, several studies have found that central 
bank independence promotes low inflation in those countries as 
well, especially when de facto rather than de jure measures of 
independence are used.”33  Indeed, Bernanke noted that this 
distinction is particularly important in Latin America and to 
convey his point more effectively, he gave the example of Brazil: 
[A]lthough a number of features of Brazilian law promote the 
independence of the nation’s central bank, the bank’s de facto 
independence may be limited by the power of the president to remove 
members of the Monetary Policy Committee.  However, the fact that 
the left-of-center Lula administration in Brazil has been able to 
support disciplined monetary and fiscal policies without significant 
 
 28 DAVID RICARDO, PLAN FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A NATIONAL BANK (1824), 
reprinted in THE WORKS OF DAVID RICARDO 506–07 (J.R. McCulloch ed., 1871). 
 29 Fraser, supra note 24 at 1. 
 30 Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Fed. Reserve Sys., Inflation in Latin America: A New 
Era?, Remarks at the Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research Economic Summit, 
(Feb. 11, 2005) (transcript available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/BoardDocs/ 
Speeches/2005/20050211/default.htm). 
 31 Id. 
 32 Id. 
 33 Id.  See infra Part I.D for a discussion of the use of de facto and de jure measures 
of independence. 
Do Not Delete 2/6/2010 1:03 PM 
70 Chapman Law Review [Vol. 13:63 
loss of popularity is itself testimony to the degree that such policies 
are becoming more widely accepted in the region.34 
Generally, however, Bernanke’s overt endorsement of broad 
central bank independence, coupled with his lauding of the Lula 
administration’s monetary policy, follows to a large degree from 
his broader conclusion that policies such as this were largely 
responsible for the achievement of price stability in Latin 
America during the 1990s.35 
Scholars have summarized the theoretical economic 
literature as essentially asserting three broad arguments to 
explain why greater independence in monetary decision making 
yields lower inflation rates.36  First, is the premise that 
government financial decision makers will tend to exert 
“pressure on monetary authorities to relax monetary 
conditions.”37  This is largely due to the fact that “[r]estrictive 
monetary policy worsens the fiscal position of the government 
through a reduction in seigniorage revenue, increase in the 
interest burden of the debt, and lower tax receipts because of the 
temporary economic slowdown.”38  The second argument is based 
on the premise that “a central bank enjoying economic 
independence will force the government to reduce the deficit” 
rather than being “forced to finance government deficits by 
printing money.”39  The third and perhaps most influential line of 
argument is quite different as it relates to time-inconsistency 
issues.40  Governments, it asserts, have short-term objectives 
which are frequently inconsistent with longer-term objectives. 
A timely example follows: In the event that a government 
attempts to stimulate the economy through a monetary 
expansion, the likely future cost is higher inflation.41  The 
argument continues by noting that a “[l]ack of credibility in the 
government commitment to the announced inflation objective 
leads rational economic agents to demand a risk premium to 
compensate for this inflationary bias.”42  After all, it was 
reasonably assumed that “governments facing a trade-off 
 
 34 Id. 
 35 See id. 
 36 Eva Gutiérrez, Inflation Performance and Constitutional Central Bank 
Independence: Evidence From Latin America and the Caribbean 1, 4 (IMF, Working Paper 
No. 03/53, 2003), available at https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2003/wp0353.pdf 
(discussion drawing from the work of Eijffinger & de Haan). 
 37 Id. 
 38 Id. 
 39 Id. at 5. 
 40 Id. 
 41 Id. 
 42 Id. 
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between inflation and unemployment are tempted to choose 
higher-than-optimal inflation rates.”43  The policy response to 
this is clear: by delegating monetary policy to a conservative 
central bank, independent of more politically sensitive decision 
makers, the risk premium can be mitigated through a more 
credible commitment to future inflation objectives.44 
Others are far more willing to ascribe less benevolent 
motives to political actors.  Fraser noted that “cynics,” whose 
skepticism he did not equally share, might also blame the 
inflation bias on the political process itself.45  Such “cynics” would 
assert that “politicians have short time horizons, stretching only 
as far as the next election.”46  Indeed, Fraser outlined the 
“treadmill of a political business cycle” as follows: 
[W]here interest rates are eased prior to an election to generate strong 
growth around election time, and the inflation does not surface until 
after the election.  After the election, interest rates are raised, thereby 
perpetuating a boom/bust cycle.  In this story, even politicians who 
understand that there is no long-term trade-off between inflation and 
economic activity are drawn irresistibly to the short-term trade-off.  
Independent and longsighted central bankers are needed to rescue 
politicians from this temptation.47 
This view of politicians as “single-minded seekers of reelection” 
has received a significant amount of attention in political science 
scholarship.48  While Fraser disclaims this view, noting that he is 
“less cynical about politicians generally,” he nevertheless adds, 
as others have concluded, that “there is an inherent bias in policy 
making which pushes policy makers towards a trade-off point 
which is soft on inflation.”49  Explaining this phenomenon, Fraser 
noted that “policy is determined and implemented under 
conditions of great uncertainty,” and “[i]t is this uncertainty . . . 
which can inject an inflationary bias into the policy making 
process.”50  He colorfully notes, “[t]hey may be reluctant to take 
away the punchbowl just when the party gets going—that 
unpopular task which the Governor of the U.S. Fed from 1951 to 
 
 43 Luis I. Jácome & Francisco Vázquez, Any Link Between Legal Central Bank 
Independence and Inflation? Evidence from Latin America and the Caribbean 1, 3 (IMF, 
Working Paper No. 05/75, 2005), available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ 
ft/wp/2005/wp0575.pdf. 
 44 Id. 
 45 See Fraser, supra note 24 at 2–3. 
 46 Id. at 2. 
 47 Id. at 3. 
 48 See, e.g., DAVID R. MAYHEW, CONGRESS: THE ELECTORAL CONNECTION 17 (2d ed. 
1974). 
 49 Fraser, supra note 24 at 3. 
 50 Id. 
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1970, William McChesney Martin, said was the duty of central 
bankers.”51 
Interestingly, many scholars have also noted that while an 
independent central bank must, to some degree, be willing to say 
“no” to political actors in order to maintain its integrity and 
freedom, it nevertheless derives its independence from a willing 
delegation by the people’s representatives.52  Indeed, Jeffrey 
Fuhrer, the former Vice President of the Federal Reserve Bank of 
Boston, noted that the integral question is not whether there 
should or should not be any political influence on central banking 
decisions, but what constitutes “undue” political pressure.53  
Pointing to prior research, Fuhrer cogently added that “a central 
bank cannot and should not maintain long-term independence 
from political pressure if it consistently acts contrary to the will 
of the electorate.”54  This balance is a complex one to achieve and 
not without significant drawbacks.  Fuhrer illustrates the time 
inconsistency problem through an effective illustration: “The 
situation is analogous to the lenient parent who, observing that 
the misbehaving child’s misdeed is done and cannot be undone, 
decides not to punish the child.  The result might be that the 
child misbehaves more often than the parent would like.”55  
Perhaps surprisingly, and adding to the complexity of this issue, 
studies have shown that the “median voter” would prefer a 
“central banker more inflation averse than himself,” while also 
preferring to remain “time inconsistent.”56 
Empirical research on the relationship between 
independence and price stability has yielded a complex but fairly 
consistent correlation.  Lawrence Summers and Alberto Alesina’s 
research demonstrated a “strong negative relationship between 
inflation variability and central bank independence.”57 Another 
study, published by the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland 
identified central bank independence as a “key factor” in 
 
 51 Id. 
 52 Gutiérrez, supra note 36 at 5; see also generally Sylvester C. W. Eijffinger & Jakob 
de Haan, The Political Economy of Central-Bank Independence, 19 PRINCETON INT’L FIN. 
SEC. (1996) (referring to a pithy quote from The Economist which noted that “[t]he only 
good central bank is one that can say no to politicians”). 
 53 Jeffrey C. Fuhrer, Central Bank Independence and Inflation Targeting: Monetary 
Policy Paradigms for the Next Millennium?, NEW ENG. ECON. REV. 19, 20 (Jan./Feb. 
1997). 
 54 Id. 
 55 Id. 
 56 Alberto Alesina & Lawrence H. Summers, Central Bank Independence and 
Macroeconomic Performance: Some Comparative Evidence, 25 J. MONEY, CREDIT & 
BANKING 151, 151–52 (1993). 
 57 Id. at 154.  The research, however, also showed that there was no demonstrable 
correlation between central bank independence and the level of variability of economic 
growth.  Id. 
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maintaining price stability.58  Pointing to the case of New 
Zealand’s extraordinary success in curbing inflation in the latter 
half of the twentieth century, the authors asserted that the 
passage of the Reserve Bank of New Zealand Act in 1989 was the 
key turning point in accomplishing this because it incorporated 
two fundamental reforms: “First, it gave the Reserve Bank 
greater independence from the central government.  Second, it 
established an explicit inflation target, becoming the first of 
many countries to do so.  Once considered the least independent 
of central banks, New Zealand’s now ranks among the more 
independent ones.”59  Extrapolating based on the experience of 
New Zealand, the authors assert that because other nations 
followed New Zealand’s example, “increased independence is, 
perhaps, responsible for a decline of nearly two percentage points 
in the average inflation rate for the industrialized nations as a 
whole.”60  The empirical results that the study provides are quite 
striking and clearly argue in favor of greater independence.  
Attempting to estimate what prior level inflation would have 
been had the New Zealand central bank been more independent 
earlier in the century, the authors noted, “holding all else equal, 
if New Zealand in the earlier time period had an independence 
score as high as today’s, then the annual inflation rate would 
have been 3.4% instead of the 7.6% that actually occurred” 
during the period from 1955–1988.61  During that earlier period, 
the Reserve Bank of New Zealand was essentially an arm of the 
financial ministry, and the country’s monetary policy was largely 
at the finance minister’s discretion.62 
Taking a broader perspective, the authors also draw the 
sweeping conclusion “that holding everything else equal, the 
increase in central banks’ independence would have lowered the 
average inflation rate worldwide from 5.6% to 3.8%.”63  While the 
authors concede that independence was not the only factor at 
play in these reductions of inflation rates and that the impact of 
central bank independence is more mercurial in the case of 
developing nations, they nevertheless conclude that “[a]n 
independent central bank is a government’s most effective way to 
ensure delivery of a low inflation rate.  Furthermore, nearly 2 
percentage points of developed countries’ average decline in 
 
 58 Charles T. Carlstrom & Timothy S. Fuerst, Central Bank Independence: The Key 
to Price Stability?, ECON. COMMENT. (Fed. Res. Bank of Clev., Cleveland, Ohio), Sept. 1, 
2006. 
 59 Id. at 1. 
 60 Id. 
 61 Id. at 2. 
 62 Id. 
 63 Id. 
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inflation over time is the direct results [sic] of their central 
banks’ increased independence.”64 
C. The Arguments Against Central Bank Autonomy 
While the arguments, both theoretical and empirical, in 
favor of central bank autonomy have largely won the day among 
economists, several factions still stand in stark opposition to 
what they label the “neoliberal” economic agenda, which they 
assert incorporates central bank autonomy as one of its central 
tenets.65  That the term “neoliberalism” has attained near-
pejorative status in certain Latin American quarters is 
undeniable.  Indeed, to a large degree it has become a rallying 
cry for aspiring despots, self-styled anti-imperialists, and 
populists throughout the region.66  This backlash has, to some 
extent, been the result of failed or poorly executed economic 
reforms put in place by various Latin American states over the 
last half-century.  It has also provided a ready basis upon which 
populist leaders have manipulated the bleak economic disparities 
endemic in the region.  Few Latin American leaders have been 
quite as successful at this sort of bluster as Hugo Chavez. 
In an intense critique of the “neoliberal” economic order, 
Dean Timothy Canova pointedly asserts that “[c]entral bank 
autonomy is a particularly sacrosanct foundation of today’s global 
economic order that undermines peace and stability.”67  In a line 
of argument familiar to Latin America observers, he goes on to 
say, “[i]n reality, central bank autonomy is a euphemism for the 
capture of monetary policy by interested private banking and 
financial interests—it is a capture intentionally designed by 
law.”68  Indeed, it is based on this perceived oligarchic conspiracy 
that Canova makes the following dire prediction: 
The Neoliberal State is destined to fail in providing peace and 
prosperity for all precisely because central bank autonomy ensures 
that monetary and economic policies will favor the few over the many.  
The empirical evidence bears this out.  Real interest rates remain at 
the highest sustained level of the century, and this remains one of the 
least recognized causes of today’s top heavy distribution of wealth and 
income both directly, by redistributing income from debtors to 
creditors, and indirectly, by keeping down the real wage rate in many 
 
 64 Id. at 3. 
 65 See, e.g., Timothy A. Canova, Financial Liberalization, International Monetary 
Dis/order, and the Neoliberal State, 15 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1279 (2000). 
 66 PLINIO APULEYO MENDOZA, CARLOS ALBERTO MONTANER & ALVARO VARGAS 
LLOSA, GUIDE TO THE PERFECT LATIN AMERICAN IDIOT 66–71 (Michael Lajda Ames trans., 
2001). 
 67 See Canova, supra note 65, at 1294. 
 68 Id. 
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industries, thereby reinforcing the hierarchies of power that dominate 
the modern corporation . . . .  The neoliberal state is one that dashes 
hopes and dreams on a mass scale, and silently impoverishes the 
public sector, while delivering great wealth to a small minority of 
global citizens.69 
As was mentioned above, however, such arguments are hardly 
unusual in modern era Latin American politics.  Their near-
ubiquity is underscored in Plinio Apuleyo Mendoza, Carlos 
Alberto Montaner and Alvaro Vargas Llosa’s groundbreaking 
study of Latin American populism, The Guide to the Perfect Latin 
American Idiot.70 
According to the authors, the perfect idiot “resorts to the old 
dichotomy of the left against the right, trusting that a purely 
semantic or emotional factor can tilt the scale in his favor.  His is 
the old scholastic stratagem of vilifying anyone who questions his 
dogma.  Neoliberalism is an anathema the idiot is trying to lodge 
into the public conscience through frenzied repetition, as was 
done in the Middle Ages with heresies.”71  Describing the mindset 
of their perfect idiot, the authors add, “in the subsurface of his 
feeble political training (a mixture of Marxist Vulgate and 
populism), has remained the idea that a businessman is an 
exploiter, getting rich off the labor of others.”72 
Referring specifically to the perfect idiot’s view of monetary 
policy and judgment, Mendoza, Montaner and Llosa note that the 
idiot “believes that [monetary issuance as a way of reactivating 
demand and making up for the shortage of resources] is also a 
means not only of development but of what he defines, with 
grandiloquent pomposity, as social investment.  He’s a friend of 
the great money-printing machine.  And he considers the policies 
dedicated to assuring sound money as reactionary, neoliberal, 
and contrary to popular interests.”73  As we shall see, infra, these 
are the very goals that Mr. Chavez outlined for his “reformed” 
central bank.74  Indeed, the authors note, the idiot’s policies have 
been “catastrophic”75 for the region.  They add, “[i]n this case, the 
fox in the henhouse is not the businessman but the state, which 
is plucking the chickens mercilessly.”76 
 
 69 Id. at 1301–04. 
 70 See generally MENDOZA, MONTANER & VARGAS LLOSA, supra note 66. 
 71 Id. at 67. 
 72 Id. at 68–69. 
 73 Id. at 69. 
 74 See infra Part III.B. 
 75 See MENDOZA, MONTANER & VARGAS LLOSA, supra note 66, at 69. 
 76 Id. 
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Along these lines, Milton Friedman offered the following 
scathing critique of the populist view of neoliberal reforms, 
especially the protection of central bank independence from 
political interference: 
No government willingly accepts the responsibility for producing 
inflation even in moderate degree, let alone at hyperinflationary rates.  
Government officials always find some excuse—greedy businessmen, 
grasping trade unions, spendthrift consumers, Arab sheikhs, bad 
weather, or anything else that seems remotely plausible.  No doubt 
businessmen are greedy, trade unions are grasping, consumers are 
spendthrifts, Arab sheikhs have raised the price of oil, and the 
weather is often bad.  Any of these can produce high prices for 
individual items; they cannot produce rising prices for goods in 
general. . . .  [T]hey cannot produce continuing inflation, for a very 
simple reason: not one of the alleged culprits possesses a printing 
press on which it can legally turn out those pieces of paper we carry in 
our pockets and call money.77 
While later scholars such as Summers and Alesina asserted that 
this broad confidence in the power of the monetary was 
somewhat misplaced,78 the essential truth behind Friedman’s 
assertion is undeniable: none of the conspirators that populist 
demagogues would blame for all their countries’ ills can actually 
print their own money, of which engaging in excessively, whether 
it be in the context of military conflict or economic upheaval, is 
most often the true cause of massive, debilitating inflation. 
Indeed, given the collective Latin American experience over 
the last half-century, what is perhaps most striking about the 
sorts of arguments advanced by Professor Canova is their dogged 
persistence.  It is, in part, this challenge that caused Fed 
Chairman Ben Bernanke to strike a more cautious note when he 
stated the following about the recent progress in Latin America: 
Worldviews tend to evolve slowly, and it is far too soon to claim that 
ideas and politics in Latin America have changed fundamentally or 
irrevocably.  Nevertheless, during the past fifteen years or so, both the 
political elites and the broader public in the region have, for the most 
part, shown an increased willingness to abandon the failed economic 
models of earlier decades in favor of new approaches that emphasize 
improved fiscal discipline, the benefits of free trade and free markets, 
and the vital importance of building strong economic institutions.79 
There can be little doubt that Bernanke’s caution was amply 
justified and to a large degree the economic policies advanced by 
Mr. Chavez and his allies in the region (including Bolivian 
 
 77 See FRIEDMAN, supra note 15, at 192. 
 78 See generally Alesina & Summers, supra note 56. 
 79 See Bernanke, supra note 30. 
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President Evo Morales, Ecuadorian President Rafael Correa, and 
Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega) underscore the lack of 
consensus around free-market oriented policies, including central 
bank autonomy. 
D. Paradigms of Analysis 
In order to more effectively study the issue of central bank 
independence, scholars have divided the topic into several 
categories that can be separated from one another to allow for 
better comparison and analysis.  Understanding these categories 
allows for a more precise definition of specifically what is meant 
by the term independence in the legal context.  To a large degree, 
much of the modern analysis of central bank autonomy has 
accepted the fact that not all independence, as the expression 
goes, is equal.80  Even the most perfect legal structure can fail 
utterly in delivering the policy objectives it was crafted to 
achieve.  Perhaps no region has stood in testament to this fact to 
a greater degree than Latin America.  Thus, merely considering 
formal legal structures in order to determine the extent of a 
central bank’s independent judgment is sorely inadequate.  In 
order to recognize this fundamental distinction, economists have 
divided the broader concept of central bank independence into 
two categories: de jure and de facto independence.81 
Underscoring this distinction, as we shall see in the 
subsequent section, central banks need not operate within the 
high walls of a complex legal framework in order to be 
substantively independent.  Beyond the more intuitive 
distinction between de jure and de facto independence, scholars 
have also divided the scope of a central bank’s actions into two 
categories: goal and instrument independence.82  This distinction 
addresses the scope of the bank’s responsibilities.  Though one 
can relate it, in a broader sense to the de jure and de facto 
distinction, it ultimately rests on the explicit authority vested in 
the institution itself.  As we shall note, the goals of a national 
central bank or monetary authority are frequently outlined 
within the authorizing laws of that institution.  That, for 
example, a central bank is guided by elected officials to dedicate 
itself to the maintenance of a low rate of inflation, or perhaps 
conversely, a lower rate of unemployment, does not mean that 
the political actors may affect the actual decision making 
conducted by the institution in order to achieve that end.  The 
 
 80 See, e.g., Jácome, supra note 9. 
 81 See infra Part I.D.1 for a detailed look at de jure and de facto independence. 
 82 See infra Part I.D.2 for a detailed look at goal and instrument independence. 
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following sections shall provide a more detailed look at these two 
sets of distinctions. 
1.  De Jure vs. De Facto Independence 
The distinction between de jure and de facto independence 
essentially rests upon the recognition that “central banks are 
institutions that operate within government and not apart from 
it . . . any attempt at legislating autonomy can never entirely 
eliminate all potential sources of tension between the political 
and monetary authorities.”83  The former Governor of the Reserve 
Bank of Australia, B.W. Fraser, notes that in order to account for 
the full complexities of central bank independence, studies must 
account for this distinction.84  Citing to his experience in 
Australia, Fraser asserts: 
[L]egal independence, which is what the empirical studies seek to 
measure, can be very different from practical independence.  In 
Australia, the legislation provides that in the event of a dispute over 
monetary policy, the government can override the Reserve Bank by 
tabling its objections before both houses of parliament.  While this is 
the legal position (which scores a negative on the index of 
independence), such a situation has never arisen in practice; and 
indexes of legal independence cannot capture the role of personalities 
(such as the Governor and the Treasurer/Finance Minister) who fill in 
the operational gaps in the relevant legislation.  Nor can they capture 
the changing policy-making environment.  For example, the greater 
reliance on market-based policies (rather than controls) in Australia 
over the past decade has significantly enhanced the degree of 
independence of the Reserve Bank, without any change in the Bank’s 
charter.85 
Fraser’s two examples underscore an important distinction 
that has also arisen in Latin America.  Very often, as in the case 
of Brazil, a central bank may be able to act with a greater degree 
of independence than otherwise provided for by the bank’s 
founding legislation.86  On the other hand, however, there are 
also clear instances, for example in Venezuela, where a bank 
lacks the real, political authority to perform its responsibilities as 
specifically outlined in such legislation.87  Luis Jácome provides a 
more detailed explanation of the Brazil/Venezuela comparison: 
[T]he Central Bank of Brazil (CBB) enjoys more effective than legal 
independence as oppose [sic] to the Central Bank of Venezuela (CBV), 
 
 83 PIERRE L. SIKLOS, THE CHANGING FACE OF CENTRAL BANKING: EVOLUTIONARY 
TRENDS SINCE WORLD WAR II 301 (2002). 
 84 Fraser, supra note 24, at 3. 
 85 Id. at 5. 
 86 See Jácome, supra note 9, at 20. 
 87 See id. 
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which on many aspects is legally rather than effectively independent.  
Regardless of the lack of legal clarity of the policy objective of the CBB 
and of having no political independence—the government maintains a 
majority in the National Monetary Council (presided by the Minister 
of Finance) and the Executive branch carries legal support to directly 
remove the President of the CBB—the government has granted the 
CBB effective independence, which has been articulated through the 
inflation targeting scheme in practice since 1999.  On the other hand, 
the CBV has been the subject of episodes of political interference that 
have limited its legally assigned economic independence.  In 
particular, the government imposed capital controls in the midst of 
the banking crisis and obtained financing for the deposit insurance 
fund, which adversely affected the conduct of monetary policy.  In 
addition, financial independence established by law has not been 
followed in practice . . . while simultaneously the CBV has been 
required to transfer to the government unrealized profits.88 
To a large degree, Jácome’s comparison of the Brazilian and 
Venezuelan experiences highlights the difficulty in capturing the 
true extent to which a central bank is independent.  Indeed, what 
is all the more troubling about his example is that the degree to 
which political actors have interfered with monetary policy-
making since his study has only gotten worse in the case of 
Venezuela and, some would argue, in Brazil as well.89 
2.  Goal Independence vs. Instrument Independence 
In their article, How Independent Should a Central Bank 
Be?, Debelle and Fischer noted that “it is useful to draw a 
distinction between goal independence and instrument 
independence.”90  Goal independence, which the authors relate to 
Grilli, Masciandaro, and Tabellini’s earlier concept of political 
independence, exists when the central bank is free to set the final 
goals of monetary policy.91  Along these lines, a central bank 
would be acting independently in this regard if it could, “for 
instance, decide that price stability was less important than 
output stability and act accordingly.”92  On the other hand, the 
authors assert, “[a] bank that has instrument independence is 
 
 88 See id. at 20–22. 
 89 See, e.g., Iuri Dantas, Banco do Brasil Insists on Independence; Cheap Loans, 
BLOOMBERG.COM, Apr. 28, 2009, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid 
=20601086&sid=axCOPPNzm1o8&refer=latin_america; John Fitzpatrick, Brazil: Lula 
Starts to Throw His Weight Around,  GRINGOES.COM, Apr. 15, 2009,  http://www.gringoes 
.com/articles.asp?ID_Noticia=2272. 
 90 Guy Debelle & Stanley Fischer, How Independent Should a Central Bank Be?, in 
GOALS, GUIDELINES, AND CONSTRAINTS FACING MONETARY POLICYMAKERS 197 (Jeffrey C. 
Fuhrer ed., 1994). 
 91 Id. 
 92 Id. 
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free to choose the means by which it seeks to achieve its goals.”93  
By way of a previous example, which Debelle and Fischer also 
cite, the Reserve Bank of New Zealand, “whose goals are 
precisely described in a contract with the government, has no 
goal independence; however, it has instrument independence 
since it chooses the method by which it tries to achieve the pre-
assigned goals.”94 
Jeffrey Fuhrer of the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston briefly 
outlines the two concepts, noting that “[g]oal independence 
allows the central bank to set its own ultimate goals (price 
stability, stable employment, and so on) and instrument 
independence allows the central bank to decide how best to 
achieve those goals.”95  Professor Carl Walsh provides a more 
expansive summary of this distinction in The New Palgrave 
Dictionary of Economics: 
Goal independence refers to the central bank’s ability to determine the 
goals of policy without the direct influence of the fiscal authority.  In 
the United Kingdom, the Bank of England lacks goal independence 
since its inflation target is set by the government.  In the United 
States, the Federal Reserve’s goals are set in its legal charter, but 
these goals are described in vague terms (for example, maximum 
employment), leaving it to the Fed to translate these into operational 
goals.  Thus, the Fed has a high level of goal independence.  Price 
stability is mandated as the goal of the European Central Bank 
(ECB), but the ECB can choose how to interpret this goal in terms of a 
specific price index and definition of price stability. 
Instrument independence refers only to the central bank’s ability to 
freely adjust its policy tools in pursuit of the goals of monetary policy.  
The Bank of England, while lacking goal independence, has 
instrument independence; given the inflation goal mandated by the 
government, it is able to set its instruments without influence from 
the government.  Similarly, the inflation target range for the Reserve 
Bank of New Zealand is set in its Policy Targets Agreement (PTA) 
with the government, but, given the PTA, the Reserve Bank has the 
authority to sets [sic] its instruments without interference.  The 
Federal Reserve and the ECB have complete instrument 
independence.96 
Understanding this distinction is necessary to fully grasp the 
extent of a monetary authority’s independence.  Indeed, to a 
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 95 Jeffrey Fuhrer, Central Bank Independence and Inflation Targeting: Monetary 
Policy Paradigms for the Next Millennium?, NEW ENG. ECON. REV. 19, 22 (Jan.–Feb. 
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 96 Carl E. Walsh, Central Bank Independence, in 1 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY 
OF ECONOMICS 729 (Steven N. Durlauf & Lawrence E. Blume eds., 2d ed. 2008). 
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large degree it is more susceptible to legal analysis than de jure 
and de facto independence to the extent that it can be more 
readily determined by considering the legal framework and 
founding documents of the central bank as an institution.  The 
murkiness of determining the extent of de jure and de facto 
independence presents a variety of challenges that go far beyond 
the scope of legal and statutory analysis.  However, this is not to 
say that determining the extent of goal independence, for 
example, is without significant complexity and ambiguity. 
Eggertsson and Le Borgne explored this topic at length in 
their study, A Political Agency Theory of Central Bank 
Independence,97 and though they drew strikingly novel 
conclusions, they did not alter the basic distinction between these 
two forms of independence.  Specifically, the authors focused on 
the following question: “Why would an office-motivated politician 
spontaneously decide to delegate his monetary policy prerogative 
to an independent but accountable central bank?”98  The great 
novelty of their study, though, is in their refusal to rely on the 
inflation bias to support their conclusion of lower interest rates, 
noting that “all agents have the same (imperfect) information.”99  
Indeed, they propose that a politician’s delegation of monetary 
policy to an independent central banker with certain minimum 
assurance of job security, including job tenure, “enables the 
central banker to commit more effort into the conduct of 
monetary policy than an elected politician could ever afford to.  
This extra effort translates in expectations, in better forecasts 
and fewer policy mistakes, which increases social welfare.”100  
Thus, they assert, it is in a politician’s “private” interest to make 
such a delegation that is both instrument and goal 
independent.101 
However, the authors conclude that while “instrument 
independence is welfare enhancing for society, goal independence 
is not” as it “benefits the current majority of the population at 
the expense of the future majority.”102  Considering the case of 
the United States Federal Reserve, the authors note that the Fed 
combines both instrument and goal independence.  They continue 
that the Board is clearly instrument independent and, given that 
its “mandate is cast in very broad terms and covers conflicting 
 
 97 Gauti Eggertsson & Eric Le Borgne, A Political Agency Theory of Central Bank 
Independence (IMF, Working Paper No. 03/144, 2003), available at http://www.imf.org/ 
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tasks (to purse [sic] both ‘maximum employment’ and ‘stable 
prices’),” its governing body interprets and assigns relative 
weight among these objectives: i.e., it is goal independent.103 
By using the example of the Federal Reserve, Eggertsson 
and Le Borgne reveal the essence of the distinction.  The Federal 
Reserve is instrument independent in that it has complete 
discretion over when and to what extent to make open market 
operations and other decisions.  Further, however, the authors 
note that the malleability of the Federal Reserve’s mandate is so 
broad that it can also be said to have goal independence. 
III.  CASE STUDIES 
The following case studies are intended to illustrate several 
of the factors described above.  While not intended to be a 
comprehensive analysis of the central banking structures 
implemented in the analyzed countries, they are intended to give 
the reader an overview of the central bank policies that have 
been adopted in the region in order to get a sense of the larger 
trends that have been in play in Latin America.  Specifically, as 
noted above, I will focus on specific constitutional or legislative 
measures that outline the scope of the central banks’ de jure 
sovereignty.  In particular, I will focus on the distinction between 
instrument and goal independence in analyzing the various 
national central banking frameworks and the historical contexts 
in which they have operated.104 
A. Argentina 
The Banco Central de la Republica Argentina (“BCRA”) was 
founded in 1935.105  The new institution replaced the existing 
currency board system, which had been in place in 1899.106  
Article 3 of the bank’s originating Charter Act No. 24,144, 
provides that the bank “shall primarily and essentially preserve 
the value of currency,” and continues by noting that “[t]he 
authorities of the [BCRA] shall involve, to this effect, the 
regulation of the amount of money and lending within the 
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economic system and the formulation of monetary, financial and 
exchange rules under the legislation in force.”107  Indeed, Article 
3 goes on to explicitly announce that the bank shall act 
independently of the Argentine President, noting, “[a]s regards 
the preparation and implementation of a monetary and financial 
policy, the [BCRA] shall not be subject to any order, 
recommendation or instruction given by the National Executive 
Power.”108 
Chapter III of Charter Act No. 24,144 specifically addresses 
issues relating to the tenure and compensation of members of the 
Board of Directors.  Article 7 provides that “[t]he president, vice 
president and directors shall be appointed by the National 
Executive Power in agreement with the Senate of the Nation; 
they shall hold office for six (6) years and may be reappointed.”109  
Further, the President may appoint members of the Board on an 
interim basis awaiting the consent of the Argentine Senate.110  As 
to the compensation paid to members of the Board, the Charter 
Act provides that this shall be left to the Board, noting, “[t]he 
fees of the president, vice president and directors shall be 
determined according to the [BCRA] budget.”111  Though the 
budget must be published at regular intervals and members of 
the Board can be punished for failing to meet this announcement 
requirement, the Board is left with the discretion of how to 
control the BCRA’s budget.112 
Finally, Article 9 of the Charter Act provides for the process 
under which members of the Board may be removed.113  The 
process is specifically outlined as follows: 
The National Executive Power shall decree, after consultation with a 
committee set up by the Honourable National Congress, the dismissal 
of any member of the Board of directors on account of misconduct or 
non-compliance with his duties as public servant.  The Committee 
shall be chaired by the President of the Senate and shall be composed 
of both the president of the Budget and Treasury Committee and the 
president of the Economy Committee of the Senate and of both the 
president of the Budget and Treasury Committee and the president of 
the Finance Committee of the Lower House.114 
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The removal power retained by the Argentine Senate and 
President would seem to be quite broad, given that it merely 
takes a decree issued by the executive and approval by the 
Senate.  Further, the specific scope of what constitutes a 
removable offense was left extremely broad.  However, there is 
not much evidence of abuse in the past.  Even during the 
tumultuous economic collapse experienced by Argentina in 2001, 
only one member of the Board, Dr. Pedro Pou, was removed.115 
B. Chile 
The Banco Central de Chile (“BCC”) was founded in 1925, 
eight years prior to the BCRA, on the basis of recommendations 
made by a commission headed by Edwin Walter Kemmerer, 
professor of economics at the University of Princeton.116  The 
projects proposed by the Kemmerer Commission included the 
monetary law “which sought to stabilize the value of Chile’s 
currency and the gold standard as the basis of the country’s 
monetary unit, the creation of the Central Bank of Chile, the 
passing of the general banking law and the general budget 
law.”117 
Title I, Section 3 of Law 18,840, titled the Basic 
Constitutional Act of the Central Bank of Chile (“Basic 
Constitutional Act”), defines the scope of the BCC’s objectives.118  
Similar to the BCRA, the Basic Constitutional Act provides that 
“[t]he Bank shall have as its purposes to look after the stability of 
the currency.”119  However, in addition to the basic anti-
inflationary authority that the BCC shares with the BCRA, the 
BCRA also has the responsibility of overseeing “the normal 
functioning of internal and external payments.”120  The Basic 
Constitutional Act also provides that, in striving to achieve these 
objectives, “[t]he authority of the Bank . . . shall include that of 
regulating the amount of currency and credit in circulation, the 
performance of credit transactions and foreign exchange, as well 
as the issuance of regulatory provisions regarding monetary, 
credit, financing and foreign exchange matters.”121 
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In terms of the degree of oversight by the Legislative and 
Executive branches of Chile, the Basic Constitutional Act 
requires that the BCC “inform” the political branches of a range 
of decisions.122  In particular, Section 4 provides the following:  
The Bank shall inform the President of the Republic and the Senate 
with regard to the policies and regulations of general applicability 
issued by the Bank in the performance of its duties.  Likewise, it shall 
advise the President of the Republic, upon his request, in all matters 
within the scope of its duties.123 
Interestingly, under Section 6 of the Basic Constitutional Act 
“the supervision and administration of the Bank shall be vested 
in the Board of the Central Bank, which shall be responsible for 
the exercise of the authority and the carrying out of the duties 
entrusted to the Bank by law.”124  However, Section 6 continues 
with a seemingly important caveat: “When passing its 
resolutions, the Board shall consider the general orientation of 
the Government’s economic policies.”125  Depending on the scope 
of its application, this caveat would seemingly limit the extent of 
the bank’s independence, especially when compared to the more 
absolute bar on executive interference provided in the Argentine 
case. 
The appointment of members of the Board, governed by 
Section 7 of the Basic Constitutional Act, occurs with “the prior 
approval of the Senate, by means of an executive decree issued 
through the Ministry of Finance.”126  Unlike the Argentine case, 
the Chilean Basic Constitution does not provide for interim 
appointments, through which the Executive could, though 
temporarily, expand his or her influence on the Board.  Section 8 
provides that members’ terms shall last 10 years, and are 
renewable.127  The Chairman of the Bank, whose term as Chair 
lasts five years (or the remainder of his term on the Board, if 
shorter) is appointed at the sole discretion of the Chilean 
President.128  Another notable difference with the BCRA’s 
structure appears in Section 10, and relates to compensation of 
board members.129  Whereas in the Argentine case, the Board of 
the BCRA establishes its own compensation levels, which it must 
publish, the Basic Constitutional Act provides the following: 
 
 122 Id. at sec. 4. 
 123 Id. 
 124 Id. at sec. 6. 
 125 Id. 
 126 Id. at sec. 7. 
 127 Id. at sec. 8. 
 128 Id. 
 129 Id. at sec. 10. 
Do Not Delete 2/6/2010 1:03 PM 
86 Chapman Law Review [Vol. 13:63 
Compensation for the Governor, the Vice-Governor and the Board 
Members shall be set forth by the President of the Republic for periods 
not to exceed two years.  For such purposes, the President of the 
Republic shall appoint, with the anticipation as may be necessary, a 
Committee formed by three persons who are former Governors and 
Vice-Governors of the Bank, who shall present a compensation 
proposal based upon the salaries being paid by the private sector 
banking institutions to their top executives.130 
Though the Basic Constitutional Act leaves a wide degree of 
discretion in the hands of the Chilean President in terms of the 
compensation of board members, it simultaneously attempts to 
make the process somewhat more objective through the 
requirement that the President institute a commission to make 
compensation proposals. 
As opposed to the Argentine case, however, the BCC’s 
requirements for the dismissal of board members is somewhat, 
though marginally, more stringent.  Section 17 of the Basic 
Constitutional Act provides that “[t]he President of the Republic 
by justified reason and the prior approval of the Senate may 
remove any or all of the Board Members.”131  The requirement 
that the President’s actions be justified is more clearly defined 
subsequently:  
The dismissal may only be based upon the grounds that the concerned 
Board Member has voted in favor of Bank resolutions representing a 
material and clear breach of the purposes of the Bank as specified in 
the first paragraph of Section 3, and provided that said resolution has 
been the main and direct cause of a material damage to the economy 
of the country.132 
Clearly, the primary distinction between this and the Argentine 
case is the high bar set for the seriousness of the offenses that 
the member of the board must be charged with by the President.  
Additionally, and interestingly not specified in the Argentine 
case, the Chilean Basic Constitutional Act also requires that 
“[t]he Board Member or Members concerned shall have the right 
of a hearing before the Senate.”133  The seemingly higher and 
more specific requirements for the alleged act, in addition to the 
right of a hearing before the Senate would seem to make the task 
of removing a member from the Board somewhat more 
challenging for Chilean political officers. 
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C. Mexico 
The Banco de Mexico, Mexico’s central bank, was also 
founded in 1925, and finds its underpinnings in the Mexican 
Constitution.134  It was not until 1931 that the Ley Monetaria de 
los Estados Unidos de Mexicanos was passed which provided 
much greater guidance in the actual operations of the bank, 
rather than the general terms of the Mexican Constitution.135  
Nevertheless, Article 28 of the Constitution specifies many, if not 
most, of the basic governing principles for the Bank, including its 
central objective and several limitations.136  First, Article 28 
begins with an explicit call for the creation of the central bank 
and the requirement that it be independent: “The State shall 
have a central bank, which shall be autonomous in exercising its 
function and management.”137  Later in Article 28, there appears 
the specific proviso that “No authority shall order the central 
bank to grant financing.”138  
Article 28 then defines the scope of the Banco de Mexico’s 
objective, noting that it “will be to foster the stability of the 
national currency’s purchasing power, therefore strengthening 
the State’s role in guiding the country’s development.”139  
Comparing this provision of Article 28 to the previous examples 
we have considered can be quite revealing.  For example, neither 
the Argentine nor the Chilean central banks are specifically 
given the additional objective of “guiding the country’s 
development.”140  Indeed, in both of the earlier cases, the 
authorizing legislation focused on the objective of price stability.  
Although, based on the text of the Article, the “development” 
objective would seem to be secondary to the primary objective of 
price stability, its inclusion is nevertheless notable.  One might 
draw a comparison to the vague terms used to outline the 
objectives of the United States Federal Reserve.  It was noted 
earlier that these vague terms, and the additional discretion that 
they imparted on the Federal Reserve, have enhanced its 
 
 134 Banco de Mexico, History of the Mexican Banknote, http://www.banxico.org.mx/ 
sitioingles/billetesymonedas/didactico/notesManufactFeaturesHistory/ 
historyMexicanNotes.html (last visited, Nov. 1, 2009). 
 135 Ley Monetaria de los Estados Unidos de Mexicanos, Diario Oficial de la Federación 
[D.O.], 27 de julio de 1931 (Mex.), available at http://www.diputados.gob.mx/ 
LeyesBiblio/pdf/152.pdf. 
 136 Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos [Const.], as amended, 
Diario Oficial de la Federación [D.O.], art. 28, 5 de febrero de 1917 (Mex.) [hereinafter 
Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos]. 
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 138 Id. 
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 140 For a discussion on the banking policies of Argentina see supra Part III. A.  For a 
discussion on the banking policies of Chile see supra Part III.B. 
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independence from political actors by increasing its goal of 
independence.141  While the terms of the Mexican Constitution 
would seem not to be subject to as broad an interpretation, they 
nevertheless would presumably allow for a broader range of 
action than either the Argentine or Chilean cases. 
As is the case in both Chile and Argentina, the members of 
the bank’s board are appointed by the President, subject to 
confirmation “by the Senate or, should it be the case, by the 
Permanent Commission.”142  Addressing the tenure of board 
members, Article 28 provides that “[t]hey shall discharge their 
office by periods, in line with the autonomous exercise of their 
functions.”143  On this point, Article 40 of the Ley de Banco de 
Mexico provides much clarification and specificity: 
The Governor will be appointed for a term of six years and Deputy 
Governors for eight years.  The term of the Governor will start on the 
first of January of the fourth year of the President of the Republic’s 
term.  The terms of the Deputy Governors will be staggered, with one 
starting every other year on the first of January of the first, third and 
fifth years of the President’s term.  The individuals occupying these 
posts may be appointed members of the Board of Governors for more 
than one term.144 
Thus, although the Governor of the Banco de Mexico is appointed 
from among the existing members of the board at the sole 
discretion of the Mexican President, the terms of the board’s 
members are staggered to end every other year throughout the 
President’s term.  As the President of Mexico is limited to a 
single 6-year term, he or she would be limited to appointing no 
more than three members of the 5-member board, barring 
retirements. 
Interestingly, the Mexican Constitution and Ley de Banco de 
Mexico establish a very high bar for the removal of members of 
the board.  The Constitution provides the following: 
They shall only be removed by grave causes and they cannot hold any 
other position or job, except those in which they act on behalf of the 
bank or those honorary related with teaching, scientific, cultural, or 
charity associations.  The people in charge of the direction of the 
central bank may be subject to impeachment in accordance with the 
provisions set forth in Article 110 of this Constitution.145 
 
 141 See supra note 103 and accompanying text. 
 142 Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, supra note 136, at art. 28. 
 143 Id. 
 144 Ley de Banco de Mexico, as amended, Diario Oficial de la Federación [D.O.], art. 
40, 23 de deciembre de 1993 (Mex.) [hereinafter Ley de Banco de Mexico]. 
 145 Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, supra note 136, at art. 28. 
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Article 43 of the Ley de Banco de Mexico, provides the following 
list of actions which would be sufficient to justify removal: 
I.  Mental illness, as well as physical affliction preventing the 
adequate fulfillment of their functions for more than six months; 
II.  Performing any job, position or commission other than those 
provided for in Article 28 Paragraph Seven of the Constitution; 
III. Stop being a Mexican citizen or fulfilling any of the requirements 
set forth under Article 39 Section III; 
IV.  Failure to observe the agreements sanctioned by the Board of 
Governors or deliberately acting in excess or in dereliction of his 
duties; 
V.  Using the confidential information available to him or her as a 
result of his or her position in his or her own benefit or that of third 
parties, or disclosing said information without the consent of the 
Board of Governors; 
VI. Knowingly submitting false information for the consideration of 
the Board of Governors, and 
VII. Leaving his or her post without authorization from the Board of 
Governors or without justified motive, baring force majeure.  The 
Board of Governors cannot authorize leave of absence for more than 
six months.146 
It should be noted that this list of possible offenses is far more 
specific than any of the others, and would seemingly make 
removal of a board member more difficult.  This is especially 
true, however, when one considers the complexity of the process 
which must also be undergone in order to facilitate this removal.  
This process, outlined beginning in Article 44 of the Ley de Banco 
de Mexico, involves several steps before even the impeachment 
stage may be reached.  First, a majority of the Board, excluding 
the member in question, must come to a verdict that at least one 
of the conditions outlined in Article 43 have been met.147  The 
accused member must be accorded a hearing in this process.148  
Once such a verdict has been issued, it must be sent to the 
President, along with “the documentary evidence supporting it 
and the written argumentation the affected party may have 
presented in his or her own defense.”149  Article 44 then requires 
that “[t]he Federal Executive shall in turn send it, together with 
the aforementioned documentation and the President’s 
considerations on the admissibility or inadmissibility of the 
removal, to the Senate or, should the latter not be in session, to 
 
 146 Ley de Banco de Mexico, supra note 144, at art. 43. 
 147 Id. at art. 44. 
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the Permanent Commission, for a final judgment.”150  This final 
judgment must follow the ordinary, more rigorous (though 
arguably not as rigorous as in the United States), process for 
impeachment provided for in the Constitution.151 
III.  THE CASE OF VENEZUELA 
A. The Banco Central de Venezuela 
First established in 1939, the last of the central bank 
institutions that we will discuss in greater detail, the Banco 
Central de Venezuela (“BCV”), was created in the wake of the 
twenty-seven year dictatorship of Juan Vicente Gomez.152  As 
part of the general upheaval of that era in Venezuelan history, 
the new government adopted a novel national economic plan 
called the February Program, which implemented a wide range of 
economic reforms, including the foundation of the Central 
Bank.153  The first major reforms to this new system were put in 
place in the 1960s and were followed by additional reforms in the 
1990s, the latter of which gave the BCV administrative 
autonomy.154  The most recent reforms to the BCV were 
implemented in 2001.155 
The primary legal framework for the BCV is derived from 
the Venezuelan Constitution and Ley del Banco Central de 
Venezuela.156  The Venezuelan Constitution, passed in 2001 with 
the sponsorship of Hugo Chavez, only briefly addresses the 
establishment of a central bank, though it does note that “the 
monetary competence of National Power shall necessarily be 
exercised exclusively by the Venezuelan Central Bank.”157  
Though this would appear to be a fairly comprehensive 
statement of the scope of the BCV’s power, several caveats are 
subsequently added.  These provisos are largely veiled references 
to various aspects of Mr. Chavez’s socialist Bolivarian agenda.  
For example, while it is repeated later in Article 318 that the 
BCV “is a public-law juridical person with autonomy to formulate 
and implement policies within its sphere of competence,” the 
 
 150 Id. 
 151 Constitución Política de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, supra note 136, at art. 28. 
 152 Banco Central de Venezuela, History of the BCV, http://www.bcv.org.ve/ 
EnglishVersion/c3/index.asp?secc=history (last visited Nov. 1, 2009). 
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 156 Ley del Banco Central de Venezuela [Law on the Central Bank of Venezuela], as 
amended, Publicada en Gaceta Oficial, 3 de octubre de 2001(Ven.) [hereinafter Ley del 
Banco Central de Venezuela]. 
 157 Constitución de la Républica Bolivariana de Venezuela, [Const.], as amended, 
Publicada en Gaceta Oficial, art. 318, 30 de Diciembre de 1999 (Ven.). 
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Constitution includes the additional requirement that the bank 
“perform its functions in coordination with general economic 
policy, in the interest of attaining the higher objectives of the 
State and the Nation.”158  What exactly would be included among 
these “higher objectives” is, not surprisingly, left deeply unclear, 
though one might fairly assume that it is a reference to Mr. 
Chavez’s “Bolivarian” Revolution.  Interestingly, and 
undoubtedly in concession to the monetary policy implications of 
his regional agenda, Article 318 includes the following, highly 
unusual caveat: “In the event a common currency is instituted 
within the framework of Latin American and Caribbean 
integration, it shall be permissible to adopt the currency provided 
for by a treaty signed by the Republic.”159  Mr. Chavez’s populism 
frequently incorporates a marked emphasis on regional 
cooperation against the perceived hegemony of the United States, 
which he labels “imperial.”160 
As to the responsibilities of the BCV and scope of its purpose, 
Article 318 provides that “[t]he fundamental objective of the 
Venezuelan Central Bank is to achieve price stability and 
preserve the internal and foreign exchange value of the monetary 
unit.”161  In order to achieve these objectives, Article 318 
continues, the functions of the BCV “shall include those of 
formulating and implementing monetary policy, participating in 
the design of and implementing foreign exchange policy, currency 
regulation, credit and interest rate, administrating international 
reserves and any others established by law.”162 
As to the selection of the board of the BCV, Article 16 of the 
Ley del Banco Central de Venezuela provides that the Executive 
“shall be responsible for the designation of the President and four 
(4) Directors of the Bank.”163  Only the nomination of the 
President must be approved by the Venezuelan Senate, not the 
nomination of the other four directors.164  Further, one of the 
President’s nominees must be a “Minister of the economic 
cabinet,” though it cannot be the Finance Minister.165  In 
addition, the National Assembly must designate the two (2) 
remaining Directors by a majority vote.166  In order to remove a 
member from the Board, similar to the process provided for in 
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Mexico, either the President or two members of the Board must 
initiate a removal proceeding.167  However, in Venezuela, a two-
thirds majority of the National Assembly of Representatives is 
required to remove the Board member.168 
B. The Terms of the Amendment and its Implications 
As noted above, the Reforma proposed by Hugo Chavez in 
2007 would have caused a substantial change in way the nation 
conducted its monetary policy.  While many observers had 
questioned the de facto independence of the BCV, one can only 
wonder what the complete abandonment of nearly all de jure 
standards of independence would have entailed.  Indeed, the 
proposed amendments did not even seek to maintain the 
appearance of independence for the BCV; they sought to make 
the institution utterly subservient to the national executive. 
From its very opening, the proposed revision to Article 318 
required that the “national monetary system must incline to the 
benefit of the essential objectives of the Socialist State and the 
well-being of the people, over any other consideration.”169  The 
 
 167 Id. at art. 26. 
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 169 La Reforma, supra note 8.  The original text, in Spanish, of Article 318 of La 
Reforma reads as follows: 
Artículo 318. El sistema monetario nacional debe propender al logro de los 
fines esenciales del Estado Socialista y el bienestar del pueblo, por encima de 
cualquier otra consideración. 
El Poder Ejecutivo Nacional, a través del Banco Central de Venezuela, en 
estricta y obligatoria coordinación, fijará las políticas monetarias y ejercerá las 
competencias monetarias del Poder Nacional. El objetivo específico del Banco 
Central de Venezuela, como ente del Poder Ejecutivo Nacional, es lograr las 
condiciones monetarias, cambiarias y financieras necesarias para promover el 
crecimiento y el desarrollo económico y social de la Nación. La unidad 
monetaria de la República Bolivariana de Venezuela es el bolívar. En caso de 
que se instituya una moneda común en el marco de la integración 
latinoamericana y caribeña, podrá adoptarse la moneda que sea objeto de los 
tratados que suscriba la República. 
El Banco Central de Venezuela es persona de derecho público sin autonomía 
para la formulación y el ejercicio de las políticas correspondientes, y sus 
funciones estarán supeditadas a la política económica general y al Plan de 
Desarrollo Integral de la Nación para alcanzar los objetivos superiores del 
Estado Socialista y la mayor suma de felicidad posible para todo el pueblo. 
Para el adecuado cumplimiento de su objetivo específico, el Banco Central de 
Venezuela tendrá entre sus funciones, compartidas con el Poder Ejecutivo 
Nacional, las de participar en la formulación y ejecución de la política 
monetaria, en el diseño y ejecución de la política cambiaria, en la regulación de 
la moneda, el crédito y fijación de las tasas de interés. 
Las reservas internacionales de la República serán manejadas por el Banco 
Central de Venezuela bajo la administración y dirección del Presidente o 
Presidenta de la República, como administrador o administradora de la 
Hacienda Pública Nacional. 
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very next sentence would have put the final nail in the coffin of 
central bank independence in Venezuela: “The National 
Executive Power, through Banco Central de Venezuela, acting in 
strict and obligatory coordination, will determine the monetary 
policies and will exert the monetary authority of the National 
Power.”170  This remarkable sentence would have converted the 
autonomous BCV into nothing more than a mere mechanism of 
Venezuelan Presidential power.  Requiring “strict and obligatory 
coordination” of the BCV would have likely stripped the long-
standing institution of nearly all discretion. 
Indeed, Mr. Chavez did not stop his complete restructuring 
of the BCV at a redefinition of its instrumental independence, he 
also significantly changed the objectives that the institution was 
organized to achieve.  Recall that the BCV, under Mr. Chavez’s 
own 2001 Constitution, was charged with the usual Central Bank 
objective of price stability.171  The Revised Article 318 reflected in 
La Reforma was as follows: “The specific objective of the BCV, 
just as that of the National Executive Power, is to obtain the 
monetary, exchange and financial conditions necessary to 
promote the growth and the economic and social development of 
the Nation.”172  That this statement is at once inconsistent with 
the objectives usually assigned to central banks and deeply 
populist in tenor does not come as a surprise given Mr. Chavez’s 
idiosyncratic style.  As if to remove any doubt from the equation, 
the Revised Article 318 continued as follows: 
The BCV is person of public right without autonomy for the 
formulation and the exercise of the corresponding policies, and its 
functions will be submitted to the general economic policy and the 
Plan of Integral Development of the Nation to reach the greater 
objectives of the Socialist State and the greater sum of possible 
happiness after all the people.173 
Finally, and perhaps tying all of the various pieces of this 
“reform” together, the Revised Article 318 would have provided 
that “[t]he international reserves of the Republic shall be 
managed by the Central Bank of Venezuela under the 
administration and direction of the President of the Republic, as 
administrator of the National Public Treasury.”174  It is arguably 
in light of this final provision that one might begin to grasp the 
full breadth of Mr. Chavez’s intentions.  Many observers noted 
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that this amendment would essentially “allow the president to 
use the country’s reserves as he saw fit.”175 
The stakes were ultimately much higher than the mere 
question of central bank independence—they related to the very 
nature of the BCV.  Mr. Chavez’s amendments so broadly defined 
the scope of the nation’s monetary policy, essentially conflating 
the BCV’s objectives with the advancement of his “Bolivarian” 
Revolution, such that the BCV would cease to be merely a 
monetary authority.  It would become at once, a slush fund for 
Mr. Chavez’s regional, political, and military ambitions, not to 
mention his domestic development goals.  A central bank that 
transforms into a development and relief agency has ceased to be 
a central bank. 
Indeed, there is precedent for this in Venezuela.  Such an 
instance of mixed purposes and the use of a state entity geared 
towards other purposes can be found in the case of Venezuela’s 
national oil company, Petroleos de Venezuela (“PDVSA”).  Since 
becoming President of Venezuela, Mr. Chavez has used PDVSA’s 
resources as personal political capital.  He has brokered regional 
energy and pipeline arrangements with allies such as Argentina’s 
Nestor and Cristina Kirchner.176  In fact, months before facing 
his own election, Chavez was embroiled in a scandal when a 
Venezuelan-American businessman was caught entering 
Argentina on a private flight with PDVSA officials and $800,000 
hidden in a suitcase, which was allegedly to be used to illegally 
support the campaign of Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner 
Wilson.177  Beyond the regional political motives towards which 
Mr. Chavez has employed PDVSA’s assets, he has also used 
billions of dollars of the company’s resources to fund vast social 
programs.178  All the while, the once-heralded company has been 
crumbling due to the fact that basic investments on maintenance 
have floundered, resulting in inactive oil rigs and falling 
production.179 
While PDVSA’s example over the last decade is hardly one 
that merits emulation, the fundamental madness of Mr. Chavez’s 
proposals to take over the nation’s central bank was in the fact 
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that his intentions seemed to have been to baldly duplicate the 
PVDSA experiment, writ-large. 
C. Aftershocks 
As illustrated earlier, although Mr. Chavez’s 2007 
Amendments ultimately failed to pass, the history of this episode 
did not end there.180  While in the euphoria of the moment, one of 
the leaders of the opposition to Chavez, Manuel Rosales, 
celebrated “a new path, a democratic path,” there can be no doubt 
that much has changed in the following year.181  Indeed, in his 
press conference immediately after the results were announced, 
he noted that the 51 percent to 49 percent defeat was 
“microscopic.”182  He added, perhaps ominously at the time, 
though perceptively, “[t]o use a phrase from February 1992, 
we’ve fallen short for now.”183  It was only days after the election 
before news sources began to report that speculation was 
beginning to mount about how and when Chavez will attempt to 
push some of the failed reforms into law, whether unilaterally by 
decree or through the National Assembly, which he dominates.184  
In the year since, much of this has come to pass.  By August 
2008, Mr. Chavez had implemented many of the Amendments he 
had sought to pass the previous year by invoking a sweeping new 
decree power that had been granted to him by the National 
Assembly.185  At the time, he seemed to allude to this new 
method of implementing his established (and rejected) ideas: “At 
this point, I’m thinking of presenting a new formula, to expand 
and launch a new perspective, to raise the speed of the process,” 
Chavez noted.186  Perhaps most famously, however, in February 
2009 Mr. Chavez won a referendum to amend the constitution 
that lifts the previous two-term limit and ensures he will be able 
to continue his “socialist revolution’’ for as long as he retains the 
support of the electorate.187  Arguably, given his success in 
accomplishing much of his rejected reforms, it is only a matter of 
time before he once again raises the issue of his access to 
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national reserves and the independence of his nation’s central 
bank. 
CONCLUSION 
The issue of central bank independence has figured very 
prominently in Latin America’s economic policy debates over the 
last several decades.  While it seemed for some time, especially 
during the 1990s that the momentum had finally swung in favor 
of greater autonomy in monetary decision making in this region 
which had for so long suffered from intermittent 
hyperinflationary contagion, it now seems that the opposing 
camp has once again pitched its tents and is preparing for battle.  
Though the populist forces, most clearly represented by 
Venezuela’s Hugo Chavez, have thus far been unable to do away 
with central bank autonomy due to resistance on the part of their 
populace, this has not been for a lack of trying and there is 
reason to believe they will try again. 
Indeed, for a region that has repeatedly suffered the 
consequences of destructive economic policy, it would seem that 
once again the barbarians are at the gate.  As Professor Larrain 
warned, “[t]he true risk of high inflation in Latin America lies in 
populism. . . .  Hyperinflation is not dead, it is merely 
sleeping.”188 
The unanswered question before us is whether the region’s 
polities will follow the wisdom of Ulysses and tie themselves to 
the mast of independent monetary decision making in order to 
avoid the populist temptations of Latin America’s modern-day 
Sirens or whether the great Latin American ships of state will 
once again crash into the rocky shoals of hyperinflation. 
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